Authored by Todd Snitchler via RealClearEnergy,

There’s a critique of PJM making the rounds: PJM – the largest grid operator in the United States – is too big. There are too many state interests at play, and PJM doesn’t have the ability to function cohesively or quickly enough. FERC even scheduled a governance technical conference this month to examine whether PJM’s stakeholder structure can move fast enough to respond to demand. The reality is that policy disagreements at the state level are dressed up as a procedural defect with the grid, opening the way for critics to point their reforms at the wrong target.

Disagreements at the state level are just what you’d expect, pitting those that generate enough power to export against those that depend on imports. Pennsylvania is PJM’s energy workhorse, shipping out roughly a quarter of everything it generates. Illinois, West Virginia, and Michigan also produce more than they consume. The others – Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey, and Delaware – are net importers, and increasingly so as data centers expand across their footprints.

Exporters like Pennsylvania that are rich in nuclear, gas, and coal generation have fundamentally different interests in capacity pricing and transmission cost allocation from an importer state, which has restricted natural gas development, leaned hard into renewables, or joined an ambitious emission reduction program. When Virginia pulls in more expensive power from its neighbors, or when Maryland absorbs double-digit rate hikes, that isn’t a governance failure – it’s the market doing its job by revealing the cost of divergent state policy preferences (and thus resource access).

These state policy preferences are then lobbed at the market and its participants to respond to, whether by prematurely retiring generation, relying on tax subsidies, or simply building generation that is more expensive per megawatt when compared against traditional baseload fuels.

PJM is actively working to continue the evolution of the market to meet the demand of today and the future. It has cleared more than 60% of its interconnection backlog under a reformed study process and opened a new study cycle this spring in partnership with Google to apply AI to speed up the review process. A separate PJM program, the Reliability Resource Initiative, pulled in more than 11,000 MW of new projects that could come online quickly. PJM has also adjusted its review processes to allow more wind, solar, and storage to compete directly in the capacity auction. It’s even accepted a price collar through 2030, demonstrating that it is willing to make short-term adjustments in response to concerns by state executives.

More than 46,000 MW of approved projects – over a quarter of PJM’s existing capacity – already hold the right to build but are unable to move forward. Some 37,000 MW of PJM-approved generation can’t even break ground at all because of state and local permitting fights. At the same time, state policy mandates have pushed working plants into early retirement, further tightening supply from the other end. The same governors demanding faster action are often the ones holding the permits and slow-walking the buildout of energy infrastructure while forcing closures of dispatchable power.

PJM is not too big. It has demonstrated time and again that it can run a competitive power market and ensure the reliable transportation of power across 13 very varied states and the District of Columbia. It’s been successfully doing this for more than 30 years, delivering $5 billion in savings annually to customers, just as it was designed to do. It’s accelerated the queue and kept the lights on. What the market cannot do is permit projects or draft legislation. States must recognize their role in restricting the full benefits of the market.

Asking PJM to continue navigating these policy issues in the same manner – trying to respond to all of them – is a recipe for disaster. The states are absolutely responsible for chucking icebergs into the path of this ship, and if it goes down, they’ll have themselves to blame for the aftermath.

Todd Snitchler is President and CEO of the Electric Power Supply Association (EPSA).